Fiscal impact
reports (FIRs) are prepared by the Legislative
Finance Committee (LFC) for standing finance committees of the NM Legislature. The
LFC does not assume responsibility for the accuracy of these reports if they
are used for other purposes.
Current FIRs (in HTML & Adobe PDF formats) are available on the
NM Legislative Website (legis.state.nm.us). Adobe PDF versions include all attachments,
whereas HTML versions may not.
Previously issued FIRs and attachments may
also be obtained from the LFC in
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SPONSOR |
Begaye |
DATE TYPED |
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HB |
HJR 02 |
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SHORT
TITLE |
Governor to Appoint PRC Members |
SB |
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ANALYST |
Garcia |
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APPROPRIATION
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Appropriation
Contained |
Estimated
Additional Impact |
Recurring or
Non-Rec |
Fund Affected |
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FY04 |
FY05 |
FY04 |
FY05 |
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NFI. |
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(Parenthesis
( ) Indicate Expenditure Decreases)
Relationship HJR 1
LFC Files
Responses
Received From
Public
Regulation Commission
SUMMARY
Synopsis of Bill
The bill would submit to the voters a proposal
to amend Article 11, § 1 of the Constitution of New Mexico. The amendment would require the five Public
Regulation Commission (Commission, or PRC) commissioners to be appointed by the
governor with the consent of the Senate instead of being elected. Governor-appointed commissioners would be
appointed from districts to staggered four-year terms and would not be
term-limited. The bill would require the commissioners’ office to be in
Significant Issues
Moving PRC commissioners from elected to
appointed officials create a myriad of significant issues and questions.
1) PRC commissioners, as elected, are directly
accountable to the citizens of the state and work on behalf of citizens
directly. However, moving commissioners
to appointed, they would be directly accountable to the governor and indirectly
citizens.
2) PRC commissioners, as elected, serve as
consumer advocates where they create policies on utilities rates, insurance
regulation, telecommunication regulation, transportation regulation, etc. based
solely on consumer interests and independent of legislative or executive
mandates or policies. However, moving to appointed, commissioners will likely
serve at the pleasure of the governor’s policy initiatives, which at times can
be counter to consumer interests.
3) Moving PRC commissioners to appointed can
create conflicts of interest. For instance, commissioners, as elected and
independent officers, are first and foremost consumer advocates and cannot
accept campaign contributions from regulated entities. However, the governor is
not constrained by the same requirements, which can create conflicts where
regulated entities’ interests have special favor with the governor/executive
and consequently filtrate down to appointed commissioners.
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS
The bill presents no
fiscal impact.
ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS
As an agency controlled by separately elected officials, the PRC is an
administratively independent part of the executive branch. Having governor-appointed commissioners would
administratively place the PRC within the governor’s portion of the executive
branch.
RELATIONSHIP
HJR 02 is very similar
to HJR 01. The only difference is that HJR 02 adds the provision that no PRC
appointee can by “employed by an entity regulated by the commission for the ten
years prior to appointment.” In addition, HJR 02 does not include language that
HJR 01 adds that address commissioners’ expertise. HJR 01 states:
“commissioners shall at minimum have four years of education or experience in
regulatory law or affairs.”
TECHNICAL ISSUES
The bill does not
provide for an effective date. However,
if passed by the Legislature during this session and ratified by the voters at
the next general election (i.e., the one scheduled for November 2004), it would
apparently be self-executing and have immediate effect. If so, would the governor be able to make
appointments to the commission immediately upon voter approval, or would he
have to await the expiration of current commissioner terms?
By declaring that
commission terms would begin on January 1 of the year following their
appointment, the bill could have the effect of creating terms as long as five
years, depending on the time of appointment.
For example, if a commissioner were appointed on January 2, his or her
term would not begin until the following January 1, thereby granting an
additional year to that commissioner’s term.
The bill also appears to leave open the question of when an interim
appointment might take effect.
If the voters approve
the constitutional amendment, the Legislature will subsequently have to repeal
the existing laws governing commissioner elections.
OTHER SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
1) Other appointments to
constitutional commissions (i.e. university regents) have language in the text
explaining: (a) on what grounds a commissioner can be removed; (b) whether a
commissioner can serve until her replacement is confirmed by the Senate; and
(c) political diversity. These items
aren’t required, but help explain how to resolve disputed situations.
2) The language is not expressly clear that the
existing commissioners will no longer serve after December 31st.
3) It is difficult to determine if policymaking
from the PRC will improve from moving from elected to appointed commissioners.
The primary objective of the PRC is to balance industry interests with consumer
interest and in the end protecting consumers from paying unnecessary expenses.
It is unclear if the ratemaking process will work better.
POSSIBLE QUESTIONS
DG/yr