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SPONSOR: |
Senate Floor |
DATE TYPED: |
|
HB |
|
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SHORT TITLE: |
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SB |
CS/SJR6/aSFl#1/aHVEC |
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ANALYST: |
Neel |
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REVENUE
Estimated Revenue |
Subsequent Years Impact |
Recurring or
Non-Rec |
Fund Affected |
|
FY03 |
FY04 |
|
|
|
|
*$13,383.8 |
*$17,845.1 |
Recurring |
General
Fund |
|
$0.0 |
*$47,581.9 |
Recurring |
General
Fund (for Public School Reform) |
|
*$2,741.0 |
*$13,400.0 |
Recurring |
Other
Beneficiaries |
|
*($16,124.8) |
*($78,827.0) |
Recurring |
Land
Grant Permanent Fund |
(Parenthesis ( ) Indicate Revenue Decreases)
* Assumes September 2003 election with voter
approval
Responses
Received From
State
Investment Council
DFA
Legislative
Council Service
LFC
Files
SUMMARY
Synopsis
of HVEC Amendment
The House Voters and Elections Committee amendment strikes item 2 of the Senate Floor Amendment, duplicates the remaining portions of the amendment and adds language earmarking the .5 percent for FY 2013 to FY2016 for public school reform.
The amendment also allows the contingent distributions to be suspended by a three-fifths vote of the House of Representatives and Senate. It should be noted that in order for the five-year market
values to decline to $5.8 billion, the LGPF would have to
decline below $5.0 billion for calendar year 2003. This would equate to a 20 percent reduction
in the value of the fund’s market ending value of
It should be noted that the contingent distributions are not effective until FY05.
Synopsis of SFl #1
Amendment
The Senate Floor amendment changes the distribution from the Land Grant Permanent Fund (LGPF) to:
· 5 percent of the five-year ending average market values,
· .8 percent for FY2005 to FY 2012 is designated to implement education reforms contingent on market values of the LGPF being in excess $5.8 billion; and
· .5 percent for FY 2013 to FY2016 contingent on market values of the LGPF being in excess $5.8 billion.
The amendment also allows the contingent distributions to
be suspended by a three-fifths vote of the House of Representatives and Senate.
It should be noted that in order for the five year market values to decline to
$5.8 billion, the LGPF would have to decline below $5.0 billion for calendar
year 2003. This would equate to a 20
percent reduction in the value of the fund’s market ending value of
As noted below the General Fund via the commons
school fund is the beneficiary of 83 percent of the distributions from the
LGPF. The methodology for the full year
impact in the revenue table are as follows:
Synopsis
of Original Bill
Senate Floor Substitute for Senate Joint Resolution 6 proposes to amend
the New Mexico Constitution to increase the annual distribution from the Land Grant
Permanent Fund (LGPF) from 4.7% to 6% of a five-year average market value. The
additional distribution shall be used to implement and maintain education
reform.
Revised Significant Issues
The
land grant permanent fund (LGPF) was established by the Ferguson Act of 1898
and confirmed by the Enabling Act for
The
LGPF consists of proceeds from the sale of state lands, royalties from natural
resource production, and five percent of the proceeds from the sales of federal
public lands in the state. Rental, bonus, and other public land income are also
distributed to trust beneficiaries. The common school fund (a subset of the
general fund) is the beneficiary of around 83 percent of trust income. The market value of the fund as of
Under
CS/SJR 6 the value of the LGPF would be approximately $30 billion in FY 2040 or
about $5 billion less than under current law (see figure 1). As expected, General Fund distributions,
which include earmarked public school reform funds are higher under SJR 6
through FY 2017, but thereafter are less than under current statute (see figure
2).
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS
The
notation in the revenue table reflects the uncertainty about the date of the
election. The $77.2 million is the full year general fund impact for FY04.
A
1994 constitutional amendment mandates that 4.7 percent plus administrative
expenses of a 5-year average of the fund’s year-end market valuations shall be
distributed to the beneficiaries. Absent
a spectacular rebound, recent market performance virtually guarantees lower distributions
in the future to LGPF beneficiaries. The forecasts in the table below are
consistent with NEPC’s 8.5 percent return assumption and a 6 percent distribution
policy.
Fiscal Year |
General Fund
Distribution (millions) |
% Increase |
2004 |
356 |
n.a. |
2005 |
352 |
-1.1% |
2006 |
342 |
-3.1% |
2007 |
335 |
-1.9% |
Investment
consultants look at permanent funds as an endowment, not a “rainy day fund”.
This is an important distinction because it implies the current generation is
obligated to pass the fund on to future generations intact. This notion is
often referred to as “inter-generational equity”. Specifically, it means the
inflation adjusted purchasing power of the distributions should not be
diminished. Alternately, it means the present value (a way of adjusting for the
time value of money) of the funds’ corpus and distributions should not be
impaired. Implicit in this standard is the assumed trade-off between the value
of a dollar today and in the future (known as the discount rate). A lower rate
makes future dollars more attractive; conversely, a higher rate implies that today’s
distributions have a higher value than tomorrow’s increased fund balances.
Experts note that the discount rate in these studies has typically ranged from
a high of 15 percent to a low of 5 percent.
In
2002, the State Investment Council contracted with New England Pension
Consultants (NEPC) to review the appropriateness of the permanent funds’
distribution policy. The following graph illustrates the tradeoff between
spending and inflation. The values on the x-axis are spending policies. The
values on the y-axis are the total loss in real value from increasing spending.
For example the loss from moving from a 4.7 percent to a 4.95 percent
distribution is a cumulative 6.2 percent of the funds’ real value. Please note
that NEPC analyzed different proposals; the results for a 6.0 percent
distribution policy would of course be larger.
TECHNICAL ISSUES
OTHER SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
By
far the most important value judgment underlying the spending policy analysis
is the supposition that the maintenance of the endowment is of greater good to
society than any alternative investment. As a recent Wall Street Journal
article shows, many trustees have and do question this principle. The article’s
most poignant argument for the spend-it-all approach comes from 1913; Julius
Rosenwald, chairman of Sears, Roebuck and Co., declared, "Permanent endowment
tends to lessen the amount available for immediate needs, and our immediate
needs are too plain and too urgent to allow us to do the work of future
generations. "The article goes on
to note that “In the first half of the century, Mr. Rosenwald's fund gave away
the equivalent of more than $700 million in today's dollars. Among many other projects, Mr. Rosenwald contributed
to the construction of nearly 5,400 schools for black children in the South. In
the years following World War I, an estimated 60% of American blacks who had
completed primary school had been educated in Rosenwald schools”.
The point here is
that the quantitative measures presented in these studies are still governed by
subjective influences; they are not “scientific” nor are they sufficient information
on which to make an informed judgment. The investments that depleted the Rosenwald
endowments had
dramatic returns
to society but would probably fare quite poorly by the present value and
inflation statistics presented in the NEPC study. In the end, policy makers
must make their own judgments as to what expenditures have the highest return
for society.
Important notes:
SN/njw:prr
Attachments