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SPONSOR: |
Foley |
DATE
TYPED: |
2/4/03 |
HB |
57 |
||
SHORT
TITLE: |
Prima
Facie Torts |
SB |
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ANALYST: |
Chavez |
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APPROPRIATION
Appropriation
Contained |
Estimated Additional
Impact |
Recurring or Non-Rec |
Fund Affected |
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FY03 |
FY04 |
FY03 |
FY04 |
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|
NFI |
NFI |
|
See Narrative |
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(Parenthesis ( ) Indicate
Expenditure Decreases)
Attorney
General (AG)
Administrative
Office of the Courts (AOC)
LFC
Files
SUMMARY
Synopsis of Bill
House Bill 57 invalidates the cause of action
“prima facie tort” in New Mexico. The
act defines a “prima facie tort” as a claim by a plaintiff for damages on the
basis that the defendant acted lawfully, but intended to cause the plaintiff
harm and succeeded in doing so. It
further lists the elements of a prima facie tort. The Act provides for the effective date of
July 1, 2003.
Significant Issues
The
act does not limit a plaintiff from pursuing another action in tort. Prima facie tort provides relief for acts not
covered by traditional tort categories.
“The theory underlying prima facie tort is that a party that intends to
cause injury to another should be liable for that injury, if the conduct is
generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances.” Restatement, (Second) of Torts § 870 (1977),
as cited in Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. at 394, 785 P.2d at 734
(1990).
The
Act duplicates language contained in the Uniform Jury Instruction 13-1631 which
states the definition and elements of a prima facie tort. The only difference is that the Act defines
prima facie tort as a claim for damages on the basis that the defendant acted lawfully,
but intended to cause harm, while the language of the jury instruction requires
only that the defendant intended to cause harm and succeeded in doing so.
FISCAL
IMPLICATIONS
The
Act contains no appropriation. The
Attorney General (AG) states the adoption of the Act would relieve the State of
the cost of claims that would otherwise lie in prima facie tort. The Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC)
indicates there will be minimal administrative cost for statewide update,
distribution, and documentation of statutory changes.
ADMINISTRATIVE
IMPLICATIONS
The AG indicates the potential for reduction of
district court dockets proportional to the number of prima facie tort
cases. The AOC states that the Act may
impact the performance based budgeting measures identified for FY 04, which may
result in a need for additional resources.
RELATIONSHIP
There are
other bills with respect to tort litigation.
Some include SB 71, limiting damages in tort actions and SB 69, limiting
tort liability arising form hot air balloon incidents.
TECHNICAL
ISSUES
The
AG indicates that the elements for a prima facie tort listed in the Act deviate
very slightly from the Uniform Jury Instruction 13-1631 (see Rule
13-1631 NMRA 2002), and perhaps should conform to it exactly if they are
included.
OTHER
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
The
adoption of the Act will render Rule 13-1631 NMRA 2002 moot. The adoption of the Act will also invalidate
the holding of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Schmitz v. Smentowski,
109 N.M. 386, 785 P. 2d 726 (1990), which recognized prima facie tort as a
valid cause of action in New Mexico.
Additionally, adoption may encourage plaintiffs to frame damage claims
in terms of existing tort categories and their respective elements, instead of
as prima facie tort.
It
is suggested as an alternative by the AG that instead of invalidating prima
facie tort entirely or retaining it unaltered, the Act could revise the
elements to make them more stringent, perhaps as modeled on New York’s
example. The cause of action as it
developed in New York added requirements; for example, that special damages be
proven, that the complaint not plead any other tortuous conduct, that the
activity complained of be otherwise lawful and not fit into any other
established tort category, and that the activity complained of be motivated by
a solely malicious intent. See
Schmitz at 394. In recent years, New
York has retreated somewhat from these requirements, allowing alternative
pleadings and expanding the definition of prima facie tort. Board of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom
Teachers Ass’n, Local 1889, 38 N.Y. 2d 397, 406, 343 N.E. 2d 278, 284-85,
380 N.Y.S. 2d 635, 644-45 (1975).